A Materialist Dialectica

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 $\mathsf{PPS}/\pi r^2$

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Part I.

« How Gödel became a computer scientist out of remorse »



Logic?

« The LOGICIST approach »

From $\operatorname{Axioms},$ applying valid $\operatorname{Rules},$ derive a $\operatorname{Conclusion}.$

Logic?

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From AXIOMS, applying valid RULES, derive a CONCLUSION.

Socrates is a man.
All men are mortal.
Thus Socrates is mortal.

All cats are mortal.

Socrates is mortal.

Thus Socrates is a cat.

$$\frac{\vdash A \to B \qquad \vdash B \to C}{\vdash A \to C}$$







As long as rules are correct, you should be safe.

Logic?

« The LOGICIST approach »

From AXIOMS, applying valid RULES, derive a CONCLUSION.

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$$\begin{array}{c|c} \vdash A \to B & \vdash B \to C \\ \hline \vdash A \to C & \end{array}$$







As long as rules are correct, you should be safe. Special emphasis on ensuring that they are indeed correct.

Logic: a long tradition of failure

• - **3XX.** Aristotle predicts 50 years too late that Socrates had to die.

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• 1641. Descartes proves that God and unicorns exist.

God is perfect, perfection implies existence, thus God exists.

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• - **3XX.** Aristotle predicts 50 years too late that Socrates had to die.

Socrates is a man, all men are mortal, thus Socrates is mortal.

• **1641.** Descartes proves that God and unicorns exist.

God is perfect, perfection implies existence, thus God exists.

1901. Russell shows that there is no set of all sets.

No one shall expel us from the Paradise that Cantor has created.

1931: Gödel's incompleteness theorem

Assume a set of rules ${\cal S}$ which is

- ① Expressive enough
- 2 Consistent
- Mechanically checkable



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then

- $oldsymbol{2}$ The consistency of ${\mathcal S}$ is neither provable nor disprovable in ${\mathcal S}$



1931: Gödel's incompleteness theorem

Assume a set of rules ${\cal S}$ which is

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- 2 Consistent
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then

- ② The consistency of ${\mathcal S}$ is neither provable nor disprovable in ${\mathcal S}$

Quis ipsos custodiet custodes?



Logic: Rise of Computer Science I

- « Rather than trusting rules, let us trust experiments. »
- You need constructive logic

From a proof of $\exists x. \ A[x]$ be able to recover a witness t and a proof of A[t].

Suspicious principles

$$\begin{array}{cccc} A \vee \neg A & \neg \neg A \to A & ((A \to B) \to A) \to A \\ \text{Excluded Middle} & \text{Reductio ad Absurdum} & \text{Peirce's Law} \end{array}$$

- From 1931, Gödel tried to atone for his incompleteness theorem
- Constructivizing non-constructive principles
 - 1 Double-negation translation (1933)
 - 2 Dialectica ('30s, published in 1958)



Logic: Rise of Computer Science II

Gödel focussed on intuitionistic logic.

The mathematician

- A constructive logic
- Advocated by Brouwer for philosophical reasons (1920's)
- Without the aforementioned suspicious axioms

The computer scientist

- Proofs are dynamic objects rather than static applications of rules (Gentzen '33, Prawitz '65)
- Witness extraction algorithmically recoverable
- From a proof one can extract a program (Kleene '49)

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Curry-Howard isomorphism (1960's)

Intuitionistic proofs are λ -calculus programs

The beloved λ -calculus

The niftiest programming language of them all!

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{Terms} & t ::= x \mid \lambda x. \ t \mid t \ u \mid \dots \\ \text{Types} & A ::= \alpha \mid A \rightarrow B \mid \dots \\ \end{array}$$

$$\frac{(x:A) \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash x:A} \quad \frac{\Gamma, x:A \vdash B}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x. \, t:A \to B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t:A \to B \quad \Gamma \vdash u:A}{\Gamma \vdash t \, u:B}$$

$$(\lambda x. t) \ u \to_{\beta} t[x := u]$$

Type derivations are proofs, compatible with β -reduction:

If
$$\Gamma \vdash t : A$$
 and $t \rightarrow_{\beta} r$ then $\Gamma \vdash r : A$.

Which logic for which programs?

Standard members of each community will complain.

The mathematician

"This logic is crappy, it does not feature the following principles I am acquainted with."

Either A or not A hold. Every bounded monotone sequence has a limit.

Two sets with same elements are equal. Every formula is equivalent to its prenex form.

The computer scientist

"This language is crappy, it does not feature the following structures I am acquainted with."

```
printf("Hello world")
        x <- 42
   while true { ... }
goto #considered_harmful
        fork()</pre>
```

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INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC

FUNCTIONAL LANGUAGE

A new hope

What Curry-Howard takes, it gives back.

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What Curry-Howard takes, it gives back.

New axioms \sim Programming primitives

1

Logical encoding \sim Program translation

The prototypical example: Classical logic

We can implement classical logic through this scheme.

New axiom

$$((A \to B) \to A) \to A$$

Used by your next-door mathematician

1

Logical encoding

double-negation translation

Gödel already did that by the 30's

Programming primitives

callcc

From Scheme, though a bit arcane

1

Program translation

continuation-passing style

The dullest JS programmer uses this

Classical logic as a logical translation

Gödel-like presentation

Translation from classical logic into intuitionistic logic.

$$A,B ::= \alpha \mid A \to B \mid A \times B \mid \bot$$

- ① If $\vdash A$ then $\vdash A^+$.
- 2 There is a proof of $\vdash (((A \to B) \to A) \to A)^+$.



Classical logic as a program translation

Curry-Howard presentation

Translation from λ -calculus + cc into λ -calculus.

$$A, B ::= \alpha \mid A \to B \mid A \times B \mid \bot$$

- ① If $\vdash t : A$ then $\vdash t^{\bullet} : A^{+}$.
- 3 If $t \equiv_{\beta} u$ then $t^{\bullet} \equiv_{\beta} u^{\bullet}$. (Untyped!)



More is less

You lose part of your soul in the encoding.

If there is an **intuitionistic** proof of $\vdash A \lor B$ then $\vdash A$ or $\vdash B$.

There are **classical** proofs of $\vdash A \lor B$ s.t. neither $\vdash A$ nor $\vdash B$.

You may want something more fine-grained...

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Dialectica.
(Gödel, 1958)

What is Dialectica?

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- A realizability translation $(-)^D$ from HA into HA^ω
- ullet Targets System T (simply-typed λ -calculus + integers + sequences)
- \bullet Preserves intuitionistic content (V + $\exists)$

What is Dialectica?

- A realizability translation $(-)^D$ from HA into HA^ω
- ullet Targets System T (simply-typed λ -calculus + integers + sequences)
- Preserves intuitionistic content $(\lor + \exists)$
- But offers two additional semi-classical principles:

$$\mathsf{MP} \frac{\neg (\forall n \in \mathbb{N}. \neg P \, n)}{\exists n \in \mathbb{N}. \, P \, n}$$

$$\frac{I \to \exists m \in \mathbb{N}. \ Q m}{\exists m \in \mathbb{N}. \ I \to \ Q m} \mathsf{IP}$$

« Markov's principle »

« Independence of premise »

(P decidable, I irrelevant)



The Good Old Gödel's translation

$$\vdash A \quad \mapsto \quad \vdash A^D \equiv \exists \vec{u}. \, \forall \vec{x}. \, A_D[\vec{u}, \vec{x}]$$

ullet $(-)_D$ essentially commutes with the connectives

The Good Old Gödel's translation

$$\vdash A \quad \mapsto \quad \vdash A^D \equiv \exists \vec{u}. \, \forall \vec{x}. \, A_D[\vec{u}, \vec{x}]$$

ullet $(-)_D$ essentially commutes with the connectivesexcept for the arrow

$$(A \wedge B)^{D} \equiv \exists \vec{u}_{A}, \ \vec{v}_{B}. \ \forall \vec{x}_{A}, \ \vec{y}_{B}. \ A_{D}[\vec{u}_{A}, \vec{x}_{A}] \wedge B_{D}[\vec{v}_{B}, \vec{y}_{B}]$$

$$(A \vee B)^{D} \equiv \exists \vec{u}_{A}, \ \vec{v}_{B}, \ b. \ \forall \vec{x}_{A}, \ \vec{y}_{B}. \ \begin{cases} A_{D}[\vec{u}_{A}, \vec{x}_{A}] & \text{if } b = 0 \\ B_{D}[\vec{v}_{B}, \vec{y}_{B}] & \text{if } b \neq 0 \end{cases}$$

$$(A \rightarrow B)^{D} \equiv \exists \vec{f}, \ \vec{\varphi}. \ \forall \vec{u}_{A}, \ \vec{y}_{B}. \ A_{D}[\vec{u}_{A}, \vec{\varphi} \ \vec{u}_{A} \ \vec{y}_{B}] \rightarrow B_{D}[\vec{f} \ \vec{u}_{A}, \vec{y}_{B}]$$

- ① If $\vdash_{HA} A$ then $\vdash_{HA^{\omega}} A^D$.
- ② MP and IP are provable through $(-)^D$.

Successes and failures

Dialectica has been used a lot

- Bar recursion (Spector '62)
- Dialectica categories (De Paiva 89')
- Proof mining (Oliva, Kohlenbach 2000's)


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
Yet, a reputation of complexity and an aura of mystery.

In this Thesis



In this Thesis





Contributions

- Reformulation of *Dialectica* as an untyped program translation
- Description of its computational content in a classical realizability style
- Extension to dependent type theories

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- Study of variants (call-by-value, classical-by-name, ...) (Ch. 10)
- Study of relationship with similar translations (Ch. 12)
- A more canonical call-by-need with control (Ch. 5)

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- Reformulation of *Dialectica* as an untyped program translation
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- Study of variants (call-by-value, classical-by-name, ...) (Ch. 10)
- Study of relationship with similar translations (Ch. 12)
- A more canonical call-by-need with control (Ch. 5)
- A lot of delightful Coq hacking! (not in the manuscript)

Contributions

Part II:

• Reformulation of *Dialectica* as an untyped program translation

Part III:

 Description of its computational content in a classical realizability style


Epilogue:

Extension to dependent type theories

Part II.

« Reverse engineering Gödel's hacks »





A proof $u \Vdash A$ is a term $\vdash u : \mathbb{W}(A)$ such that $\forall x : \mathbb{C}(A).\ u \perp_A x$

Cleaning up

Gödel used System T + sequences as a target.

	W	\mathbb{C}
$A \rightarrow B$	$ \begin{cases} \mathbb{W}(A) \to \mathbb{W}(B) \\ \mathbb{W}(A) \to \mathbb{C}(B) \to \mathbb{C}(A) \end{cases} $	$\mathbb{W}(A) \times \mathbb{C}(B)$
$A \times B$	$\mathbb{W}(A) \times \mathbb{W}(B)$	$\mathbb{C}(A) \times \mathbb{C}(B)$
A + B	$\mathbb{W}(A) imes \mathbb{W}(B) imes \mathbb{B}$	$\mathbb{C}(A) \times \mathbb{C}(B)$

Cleaning up

Gödel used System T + sequences as a target. We use true datatypes!

Coming from a linear decomposition due to De Paiva and Hyland (1989). We restrict to propositional logic (for now).

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A scrutiny into the term translation

$$\Gamma \vdash t : A \longrightarrow \begin{cases} \mathbb{W}(\Gamma) \vdash t^{\bullet} : \mathbb{W}(A) \\ \mathbb{W}(\Gamma) \vdash t_{x_{1}} : \mathbb{C}(A) \to \mathbb{C}(\Gamma_{1}) \\ \dots \\ \mathbb{W}(\Gamma) \vdash t_{x_{n}} : \mathbb{C}(A) \to \mathbb{C}(\Gamma_{n}) \end{cases}$$

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- t^{\bullet} is essentially t, except $(\lambda x. t)^{\bullet} \equiv (\lambda x. t^{\bullet}, \lambda x \pi. t_x \pi)$
- t_x depends on two families of terms

$$\varnothing_A: \mathbf{C}(A)$$

$$@_A: \mathbf{C}(A) \to \mathbf{C}(A) \to \mathbf{W}(A) \to \mathbf{C}(A)$$
 s.t.
$$u \perp_A \pi_1 @_A^u \pi_2 \qquad \leftrightarrow \qquad u \perp_A \pi_1 \wedge u \perp_A \pi_2$$

ullet arnothing (resp. @) is used when weakening occurs (resp. duplication)

Almost there

If $\vdash t : A$ then

- $\mathbf{0} \vdash t^{\bullet} : \mathbb{W}(A).$
- ② For all $\pi : \mathbb{C}(A)$, $t^{\bullet} \perp_A \pi$.

Almost there

If $\vdash t : A$ then

- $\bullet \vdash t^{\bullet} : \mathbb{W}(A).$
- ② For all $\pi : \mathbb{C}(A)$, $t^{\bullet} \perp_A \pi$.

There exists t_1 and t_2 s.t. $t_1 \equiv_{\beta} t_2$ but $t_1^{\bullet} \not\equiv_{\beta} t_2^{\bullet}$.

We would need equations that do not hold, such as

$$\pi \ @_A^t \ \varnothing_A \quad \equiv_\beta \quad \pi \quad \equiv_\beta \quad \varnothing_A \ @_A^t \ \pi$$

because they are defined in a quite ad-hoc, non parametric way.

The usual suspects

- As we have just seen, the problem appears because of @ and \varnothing .
- ullet Actually already criticized because it requires decidability of $oldsymbol{\perp}$.
- Solved by the Diller-Nahm variant using finite sets (1974)
- They are Gödel's workarounds defined in a very hackish way

The usual suspects

- As we have just seen, the problem appears because of @ and \varnothing .
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- Solved by the Diller-Nahm variant using finite sets (1974)
- They are Gödel's workarounds defined in a very hackish way

We use a similar trick by using finite **multi**sets.

The desired equations hold naturally and parametrically.

Revising the translation

Before After $\varnothing_A: |\mathfrak{MC}(A)|$ $\varnothing_A:\mathbb{C}(A)$ $@_A: \left| \mathfrak{M} \, \textcolor{red}{\mathbb{C}}(A) \, \right| \to \left| \, \mathfrak{M} \, \textcolor{red}{\mathbb{C}}(A) \, \right| \to \left| \, \mathfrak{M} \, \textcolor{red}{\mathbb{C}}(A) \, \right|$ $@_A : \mathbb{C}(A) \to \mathbb{C}(A) \to \mathbb{W}(A) \to \mathbb{C}(A)$ $\begin{cases} \mathbb{W}(A) \to \mathbb{W}(B) \\ \mathbb{W}(A) \to \mathbb{C}(B) \to \mathbb{C}(A) \end{cases}$

$$x_x \qquad \equiv \lambda \pi. \{\pi\}$$

$$x^{\bullet} \qquad \equiv \qquad x$$

$$(\lambda x. t)^{\bullet} \qquad \equiv \begin{cases} \lambda x. t^{\bullet} \\ \lambda x \pi. t_x \pi \end{cases}$$

$$(t u)^{\bullet} \qquad \equiv \quad (\text{fst } t^{\bullet}) u^{\bullet}$$

$$x_{x} \qquad \equiv \quad \lambda \pi. \{\pi\}$$

$$x^{\bullet} \qquad \equiv \quad x \qquad \qquad y_{x} \qquad \equiv \quad \lambda \pi. \varnothing$$

$$(\lambda x. t)^{\bullet} \qquad \equiv \begin{cases} \lambda x. t^{\bullet} \\ \lambda x \pi. t_{x} \pi \end{cases}$$

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$$x_{x} \equiv \lambda \pi. \{\pi\}$$

$$x^{\bullet} \equiv x \qquad y_{x} \equiv \lambda \pi. \emptyset$$

$$(\lambda x. t)^{\bullet} \equiv \begin{cases} \lambda x. t^{\bullet} \\ \lambda x \pi. t_{x} \pi \end{cases} \qquad (\lambda y. t)_{x} \equiv \lambda(y, \pi). t_{x} \pi$$

$$(t u)^{\bullet} \equiv (\text{fst } t^{\bullet}) u^{\bullet}$$

$$x_{x} \equiv \lambda \pi. \{\pi\}$$

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$$(t u)^{\bullet} \equiv (\mathbf{fst} t^{\bullet}) u^{\bullet} \qquad (t u)_{x} \equiv \lambda \pi. \begin{pmatrix} (\mathbf{snd} t^{\bullet}) u^{\bullet} \pi \gg u_{x} \\ 0 \\ t_{x} (u^{\bullet}, \pi) \end{pmatrix}$$

$$x_{x} \equiv \lambda \pi. \{\pi\}$$

$$x^{\bullet} \equiv x \qquad y_{x} \equiv \lambda \pi. \emptyset$$

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- ① If $\vdash t : A$ then $\circ \vdash t^{\bullet} : \mathbb{W}(A)$. \circ For all $\pi : \mathbb{C}(A)$, $t^{\bullet} \perp_{A} \pi$.
- 2 If $t_1 \equiv_{\beta} t_2$ then $t_1^{\bullet} \equiv_{\beta} t_2^{\bullet}$



A note on orthogonality

- The orthogonality can be expressed in this setting.
- Yet it is no more useful for now.
- The Gödel-style *Dialectica* used Friedmann's trick for \emptyset_0 :

$$\mathbb{W}(0) \equiv 1$$
 and $\mathbb{C}(0) \equiv 1$

- You needed to rule out invalid proofs of W(0).
- Not the case anymore with multisets, $W(0) \equiv 0$.
- Soundness for free!


Part III.

« When Krivine meets Gödel »






You are here



You are here



What is actually doing the translation as a program?

What rôle on earth have the counters?

Let us introduce you to the Krivine Abstract Machine (KAM).

$$\begin{array}{llll} \text{Closures} & c & ::= & (t,\sigma) \\ \text{Environments} & \sigma & ::= & \emptyset \mid \sigma + (x := c) \\ \text{Stacks} & \pi & ::= & \varepsilon \mid c \cdot \pi \\ \text{Processes} & p & ::= & \langle c \mid \pi \rangle \\ \end{array}$$

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Closures
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Stacks $\pi ::= \varepsilon \mid c \cdot \pi$
Processes $p ::= \langle c \mid \pi \rangle$

$$\langle (t u, \sigma) \mid \pi \rangle \qquad \rightarrow \langle (t, \sigma) \mid (u, \sigma) \cdot \pi \rangle$$

The Krivine Abstract Machine™

Push

Let us introduce you to the Krivine Abstract Machine (KAM).

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Pop
$$\langle (\lambda x. t, \sigma) \mid c \cdot \pi \rangle \rightarrow \langle (t, \sigma + (x := c)) \mid \pi \rangle$$

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Closures
$$c ::= (t, \sigma)$$

Environments $\sigma ::= \emptyset \mid \sigma + (x := c)$
Stacks $\pi ::= \varepsilon \mid c \cdot \pi$
Processes $p ::= \langle c \mid \pi \rangle$

Grab
$$\langle (x, \sigma + (x := c)) \mid \pi \rangle \rightarrow \langle c \mid \pi \rangle$$

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Processes $p ::= \langle c \mid \pi \rangle$

Garbage
$$\langle (x, \sigma + (y := c)) \mid \pi \rangle \rightarrow \langle (x, \sigma) \mid \pi \rangle$$

Let us introduce you to the Krivine Abstract Machine (KAM).

Closures $c := (t, \sigma)$

Environments
$$\sigma ::= \emptyset \mid \sigma + (x := c)$$
Stacks $\pi ::= \varepsilon \mid c \cdot \pi$
Processes $p ::= \langle c \mid \pi \rangle$

PUSH $\langle (t \, u, \sigma) \mid \pi \rangle \qquad \rightarrow \langle (t, \sigma) \mid (u, \sigma) \cdot \pi \rangle$
POP $\langle (\lambda x. \, t, \sigma) \mid c \cdot \pi \rangle \qquad \rightarrow \langle (t, \sigma + (x := c)) \mid \pi \rangle$
GRAB $\langle (x, \sigma + (x := c)) \mid \pi \rangle \rightarrow \langle c \mid \pi \rangle$
GARBAGE $\langle (x, \sigma + (y := c)) \mid \pi \rangle \rightarrow \langle (x, \sigma) \mid \pi \rangle$

A word on the KAM

- The KAM is call-by-name, implementing linear head reduction
- Used amongst other things to do classical realizability (Krivine '02)
- Features stacks and environments as first-class objects
- In particular, typing can be extended to stacks and environments

$$\vdash \pi : A^{\perp} \qquad \sigma \vdash \Gamma$$

- Double-negation and forcing already explained through the KAM
 - Double-negation using callcc (Griffin '90, Krivine '03)
 - Forcing using a monotonous global variable (Miquel '11)

$$\mathbb{C}(A \to B) \equiv \mathbb{W}(A) \times \mathbb{C}(B)$$

$$\langle (\lambda x. t, \sigma) \mid c \cdot \pi \rangle \rightarrow \langle (t, \sigma + (x := c)) \mid \pi \rangle$$

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Counters are stacks!

$$\mathbb{C}(A \to B) \equiv \mathbb{W}(A) \times \mathbb{C}(B)$$

$$\langle (\lambda x. t, \sigma) \mid c \cdot \pi \rangle \rightarrow \langle (t, \sigma + (x := c)) \mid \pi \rangle$$

Counters are stacks!

Dialectica gives access to stacks!

Closures all the way down

Let:

- $\bullet \ \text{a term} \ \vec{x} : \Gamma \vdash t : A$
- a closure $\sigma \vdash \Gamma$
- ullet a stack $\vdash \pi : A^{\perp}$ (i.e. $\pi^{\bullet} : \mathbb{C}(A)$)

Closures all the way down

Let:

- a term $\vec{x}: \Gamma \vdash t: A$
- a closure $\sigma \vdash \Gamma$
- a stack $\vdash \pi : A^{\perp}$ (i.e. $\pi^{\bullet} : \mathbb{C}(A)$)

Then

$$(t_{x_i}\{\vec{x}:=\sigma^{\bullet}\})\,\pi^{\bullet}:\mathfrak{M}\mathbb{C}(\Gamma_i)\equiv\{\rho_1;\ldots;\rho_m\}$$

are the stacks encountered by x_i while evaluating $\langle (t, \sigma) \mid \pi \rangle$, i.e.

$$\langle (t,\sigma) \mid \pi \rangle \quad \longrightarrow^* \quad \langle (x_i,\sigma_1) \mid \rho_1 \rangle$$

$$\vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots$$

$$\longrightarrow^* \quad \langle (x_i,\sigma_m) \mid \rho_m \rangle$$

The $(-)_x$ translation tracks the uses of x as delimited continuations.

17/09/2015

Look around you

$$x_x \equiv \lambda \pi. \{\pi\}$$

$$y_x \equiv \lambda \pi. \varnothing$$

$$(\lambda y. t)_x \equiv \lambda(y, \pi). t_x \pi$$

$$(t \, u)_x \equiv \lambda \pi. \begin{pmatrix} (\operatorname{snd} t^{ullet}) \, u^{ullet} \, \pi \gg u_x \\ @ \\ t_x (u^{ullet}, \pi) \end{pmatrix}$$

A little issue

The stacks produced by the KAM are ordered by sequentiality.

The Dialectica produces multisets of stacks without regard to order.

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The Dialectica produces multisets of stacks without regard to order.

Not possible to fix easily (or at all?)
A defect of linear logic ?

Revisiting MP + IP

In the historical presentation:

- ullet IP essentially obtained by arnothing + realizability
- MP is more magical

$$\begin{array}{lll} \mathbb{W}(\mathtt{MP}) & \cong & \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N} \\ \mathtt{mp} & := & \lambda x. \ x \end{array}$$

Revisiting MP + IP

In the historical presentation:

- ullet IP essentially obtained by \varnothing + realizability
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In the revised Dialectica:

- Not a realizability and no $\varnothing \leadsto$ no IP
- The historical realizer of the MP takes another flavour

Need to weaken $\neg A$ into $\sim A \equiv A \rightarrow \bot$ where

$$\mathbb{W}(\bot) \equiv 1$$
 $\mathbb{C}(\bot) \equiv 1$ () $\not\perp_{\bot}$ () (no rule for \bot)

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- - You need the orthogonality to ensure that the returned multiset is **classically** not empty!

$$f \Vdash \sim \sim A \leftrightarrow$$

$$\forall \varphi : \mathbb{W}(A) \to \mathfrak{M} \, \mathbb{C}(A). \, \neg (\forall u : \mathbb{W}(A) \in f \, \varphi. \, \neg (\forall \pi : \mathbb{C}(A) \in \varphi \, u. \, u \perp_A \pi))$$

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- ① First issue: $\mathbb{W}(\neg A) \cong \neg \mathbb{W}(A)$
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4 Extract using $\varphi \equiv \lambda$ _. \varnothing and enjoy (if A is first-order).

$$\exists u : \mathbf{W}(A) \in f \, \varphi$$

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Comparison with historical Dialectica

- We've got rid of IP: it's not a bug, it's a feature!
- MP has a clearer meaning now.
 - The delimited continuation part extracts argument access to functions
 - We made explicit a crawling over finite multisets that were hard-wired into @ in the historical version
- In particular we may do fancier things now
 - Counting the number of accesses of a function to a variable
 - More ...?

Epilogue.

« You're not done yet. »

L'OISEAU DE MINERVE et TÉLÉMONDIAL présentent

LA DIALECTIQUE PEUT-ELLE CASSER DES BRIQUES?

LE PREMIER FILM ENTIÈREMENT DÉTOURNÉ DE L'HISTOIRE DU CINÉMA V.O. SOUS-TITRES PAR L'ASSOCIATION POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DES LUTTES DE CLASSES ET LA PROPAGATION DU MATÉRIALISME DIALECTIQUE

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Dependently-typed Dialectica

This translation naturally lifts to dependent types

- What about dependent elimination?
 - Hints in this thesis
 - Actually solved after the manuscript was submitted (kudos to Andrej)
 - Essentially make $\mathbb{C}(A)$ highly depend on some value $u: \mathbb{W}(A)$
 - Decomposes through CBPV (Levy '01)
- Difficult to implement in practice?
 - Computational implementation of multisets?
 - We should be using HITs (HoTT Book)
 - TODO: Write an implementation of Dialectica in Coq

Intuitionism is the new linear

- Dialectica is the prototypical model of LL
 - « Double-glueing, le mot est lâché! »
- Towards a « free model » of LL in LJ?
 - « A new linear logic: intuitionistic logic »
- Delimited continuations and dependency probably needed
- Linear logic is not about linearity

Intuitionistic enough translations

• \mathcal{D} ialectica shares common properties with (intuitionistic) forcing. In particular, $\mathbb{W}(-)$ commutes with positives.

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- Dialectica shares common properties with (intuitionistic) forcing. In particular, $\mathbb{W}(-)$ commutes with positives.
- This is a moral requirement to preserve dependent elimination.
- Occurs strikingly often with commutative / idempotent monads.
 - Forcing (a monotonous reader monad on (\mathbb{P}, \leq))
 - Intuitionistic CPS (similar but with stacks)
 - Dialectica (a rich writer on $\mathbb{C}(A) \to \mathfrak{MC}(\Gamma)$)
 - Sheafification (?)
- Probably something deep there

Conclusion

- We demystified Gödel's Dialectica translation.
- Actually using concepts inexistents at the time of Gödel:
 - Computational content of proofs
 - Stacks
 - Explicit substitutions
- We described computationally the contents of Markov's principle.
- This presentation allows for a lot of extensions and future work.

Scribitur ad narrandum, non ad probandum

Thanks for your attention.